Book Review: United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, An Economic Analysis of an Antitrust Case by Bowman, Ward S., Jr.
REVIEWS
UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF AN ANTITRUST CASE. By Carl Kaysen. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1956. Pp. xi, 404. $6.50.
SHERMAN Act cases, especially under section 2, are involved, expensive and
time-consuming, requiring the resolution of issues in which law and economics
have become inseparably interrelated. When assigned to the United Shoe
Alachihery I case Judge \Vyzanski, recognizing the relationship of economic
criteria to the public policy embodied in the antitrust laws and the necessarily
"economic" judgment that he would render, sought the assistance of a trained
economist. Thus, Carl Kaysen, Harvard economist, became a "law clerk."
His analysis of the principal issues of the case forms the subject matter of this
book, Volume 99 in the Harvard Economic Studies.
Kaysen's economic study (based on the record of the case) indicates that
United occupies some 85 per cent of the shoe machinery market. The market
share for major machines is estimated at 91 per cent, for minor machines at
74 per cent.2 This, according to Kaysen, is not evidence that the company has
"in any economic sense relevant to a Sherman Act case, a monopoly position
in that market."3 Search for economic power must look beyond the bare per-
centages (however high), according to Kaysen. Two methods are used in
attempting to probe the extent of United's power: first, past behavior in the
market-the record of performance: and second, the possible obstacles to
competitive behavior in the industry--structural tests. Primary emphasis is
placed on the second method, structural aspects, in the organization of Kay-
sen's analysis, but performance criteria are not limited to the chapters con-
cerned with United's performance in the market (Chapters 4 and 5). In fact
the preceding chapters on market power (Chapters 2 and 3), especially the
parts dealing with the evaluation of potential competition and the probability
of new entry, place heavy weight on United's selling system, which involves
restrictive leasing practices, full-line selling and price discrimination. More-
over, Kaysen's conclusion resolves itself into a recommendation of control over
United's performance in the hope that this will eventually make for a better
structure by making new entry more attractive.
1. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
2. P. 5o.
3. Pp. 50-51. The author is being extremely careful here. The presumption of mo-
nupoly with these kinds of percentages of control, especially over long periods of time, is
so strong as to suggest that there is very little likelihood that it can be anything but
monopuly. And Kaysen's own analysis is not suggestive of what could be found to make
such a conclusion reversible.
HeinOnline  -- 66 Yale L.J. 303 1956-1957
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Monopoly Power
Examination of United's position in the machinery market led to Kaysen's
conclusion that "United has substantial power in that market, based chiefly
on acquisitions, leasing, and full-line selling."'4 An additional factor which but-
tresses this conclusion is the lack of strength of the competition-of twenty-
two known competitors the largest are Compo, with some 3.4 per cent of the
major machines installed in shoe factories, and the International Shoe Ma-
chinery Corporation, with 0.6 per cent. None of the competing machinery
manufacturers produces anything approaching the full line of machinery
handled by United. In addition, potential competition from new entry is un-
likely. Long term leasing as opposed to sale, a machinery return system, full
capacity clauses 5 in United's leases and the nonseparability of charges for
United's machinery servicing are all found to present serious impediments to
the entry of new firms as well as to the expansion of existing firms. Impedi-
ments to entry are also found to exist because of United's full line; United can
not only tie the use of one machine to the use of another complementary ma-
chine to the disadvantage of the short-line supplier, but it also has and exer-
cises the power to discriminate among users when potential competition
threatens in a particular field.6 Also restrictive of new entry are a strong
patent position and long-accumulated technical know-how, especially signifi-
cant here because of the unique technical characteristics of shoe machinery.
In addition, stable demand conditions make for less entry than in an expanding
market. The entry of new firms under these circumstances, it is stressed, re-
quires the replacement of existing firms.
Acquisition of competing companies or competing patents was not found to
contribute greatly to United's overall market position. Over the last twenty-
two years expenditure for acquisitions by United amounted to approximately
$3.4 million. One acquisition, however, the Littleway Process Company, com-
pleted in two steps between 1924 and 1927, aggregated $2.7 million, almost
two-thirds of the total.'
After discussing the foregoing aspects of United's power Kaysen is still
left with the essential question of whether or not United's dominant position
can be explained by economies of scale. Is this a "natural monopoly," a de-
clining cost industry? Can the market support more than one efficient pro-
4. P. 100.
5. This is a provision requiring the use of United leased machines to full capacity
whenever work is available on which they can be used.
6. Kaysen does not go so far as to suggest that price discrimination has been used as
a device to gain a monopoly, but he seems to suggest that it can be used to hold onu.
There is no clarification as to exactly how or as to what the essential difference is be-
tween "driving out" and "keeping out" in economic terms (see p. 74, for example). He
does not suggest recoupment. Primarily, however, Kaysen uses his "discrimination" evi-
dence as indicating the existence of power.
7. Little was a potential competitor with a new process for staple side lasting and
sole sewing. This process came to be called the Littleway process. P. 60.
[Vol. 6
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ducer? The discussion here is highly speculative and the tentative uneasy con-
clusions are carefully stated in "lawyerlike" terms. The existence of the small
competitor Compo, for example, "suggests strongly that it is not necessary to
achieve United's size to operate efficiently in the shoe machinery industry.""
This statement is almost immediately qualified: "The inconclusiveness of the
comparison arises, of course, from the fact that Compo manufactures a much
smaller variety of machines than does United and, in particular, it manufac-
tures machines which are, by and large, less complicated from the design, pro-
duction and service points of view than some of United's major machines." 9
The demand for shoe machinery is such that production is essentially a "job
shop" business with a wide variety of products and small orders. A typical lot
size, about 75 pieces, is small relative to the scale of the shop and involves a
great deal of setting-up time. In any given year some 40,000 different parts
are manufactured. I0 "All this evidence indicates that there are no significant
economies of scale in Beverly [the manufacturing plant in Massachusetts]
manufacturing operations compared to even a fairly small shop. . . ."11 On the
other hand, Kaysen is faced with the stubborn fact that United's shoe ma-
chinery manufacture is concentrated in one plant.
As to economies of distribution, "there is practically no evidence in the record
pointing one way or the other .... 112 With respect to service, as distinct from
distribution, the data available are characterized as suggesting, but falling very
short of confirming, that "branch office road service could be performed at the
same, or only slightly less. efficiency by a much smaller organization than
United."' 3 Also, "even substantial economies in the performance of these
functions [specialized expert service from the Boston office] would lead to
overall savings of very small proportions.'1
4
The conclusion with respect to the relationship of research requirements and
scale economies is equally equivocal. The general tenor of the defense argu-
ment on this point, according to Kaysen, was to emphasize the expense, com-
plexity and riskiness of United's research, and the necessity of arrangements
in the market which would pay for it-including particularly the leasing
arrangements, and by implication price discrimination and monopoly.1' Kaysen
recognizes the importance of cross-application of skills and the financial require-
nients of financing many failures to get one success, but finds no evidence that








15. The implication of the defense argument on this point is that monopoly revenue,
which is maximized by discriminatory pricing, is essential to provide funds to carry on
complicated and risky research.
16. P. 98.
19561
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In total the evidence does not support a finding that United is a "natural
monopoly." In terms of the legal criteria provided by Judge Learned Hand
in the Alcoa case, 17 United's monopoly was not "thrust upon it." '
United's Performance
Analysis of United's behavior in the market serves several purposes in this
study. It serves as corroborative evidence of the conclusion that United has
substantial market power; it is utilized to ascertain whether there was a
specific intent to monopolize; but most important, irrespective of intent, it is
important for determining whether the effect of United's business policy and
marketing practice was such as to create or maintain the monopoly power
which Kaysen concludes United possessed.
As to the problem of coercive practices as evidence of "evil" intent Kaysen,
as an economist, finds it irrelevant, or at least unimportant, except to evidence
the power behind the force which is exercised. The government's case against
United gave a prominent position to coercive practices, probably because inter-
pretation of the current legal doctrine (embodied in Hand's opinion in the
Alcoa case) does not clearly rule out the necessity of showing an intent to
exercise market power, as well as its mere existence, for a finding that section
2 of the Sherman Act has been violated. With the exception of United's prac-
tice of purchasing and scrapping second-hand machinery, Kaysen finds none
of the practices detailed by the government to be unequivocally exclusionary.
He finds the machinery scrapping policy "has no useful result other than the
enhancement of United's market power."'19 As to the diligence with which
United kept track of competitors in minute detail, Kaysen says: "Fear of com-
petition may not in law be relevant to intent to monopolize; but for whatever
relevance it may have [perhaps a triumph of mind over what doesn't matter],
the conclusion that United feared a competitor above all things is one which
jumps out from the evidence."12 0
After reviewing in some detail the evidence on price-cost relationships Kay-
sen concludes that it indicates poor market performance, in the sense of wide
departure over long periods of time from the kind of results which would exist
in a competitive market, in two respects:
"(a) the shoe manufacturer's and ultimately the shoe-wearer's choice
among different shoe constructions is not made on terms which correspond
to the real social costs of the alternatives; and (b) United's own knowl-
17. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. In economic terms Kaysen's economy of scale analysis is far from convincing. It
was not strong enough to recommend dismembering the machinery manufacturing organi-
zation of United, for example. The legal burden of showing that monopoly is "thrust
upon' a corporation, according to Judge Hand, rests on the defendant. Kaysen's conclusion
in effect is that United did not overcome a presumption that its power did not rest on
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edge of its costs in respect to individual machine types is so imprecise as
to raise serious doubts as to the purely internal efficiency of its opera-
tions." 21
Such is Kaysen's conclusion as to the over-all results of United's price policy.
As to specific instances of discrimination, Kaysen, as many other economic
analysts before him, is unable to distinguish clearly an intent to make higher
profits from an intent to exclude.
This evaluation of price-cost relationships leaves unanswered troublesome
questions. Irrespective of the great departure of United's performance from
the competitive ideal, given the single dominant company, would performance
be better or worse in economic terms if there were no price discrimination
(making for less profit maximization with either higher or lower prices) ; and
would it be better or worse if sale rather than lease of machines actually make
for greater efficiency and higher profits as Kaysen has implied? Kaysen's con-
clusion here, interestingly enough, is not only that United's practice departs
widely from the competitive ideal, but also that it departs widely from the
economist's notion of the monopoly ideal-profit maximization. Kaysen stresses
the benevolent paternalism of United.22 It would be ironical indeed if the result
of an antitrust case brought about a more perfect realization of the latter over
the objection of a defendant who is accused of being too benevolent.
Most of the next part of Kaysen's analysis, Chapter 5, is an attempt to
evaluate the opposing contentions of the parties with respect to research and
patent policy. The volume of the testimony and other evidence here, Kaysen
says, contrasts sharply with the paucity of conclusions it is made to support.
A central question, which bulks large in Kaysen's evaluation and the answer
to which is embodied in his recommended relief, relates to the leasing system
and its alleged (by United) importance to successful research.
United spends large amounts on research. In 1950 the total was $4.3 million,
with approximately six hundred persons engaged in research.23 Research and
improvement of important major machines is broadly correlated with their
revenue producing importance.24 Kaysen indicates that United does "engage
actively, continuously, and on a large scale in a well-organized and technically
efficient research program."2 In no specific sense does he find it being used to
eliminate competition. On the result side, however, he finds no record of spec-
tacular achievement. He characterizes progress as glacial in its character. 2
Moreover, he finds that a small competitor, Compo, for its size (and on simple
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Kaysen is not impressed with United's argument that
"the leasing system as it now operates serves to maintain a delicate balance
in the complicated interrelationships among various shoe construction
processes, the machines needed in making them, the service and training
requirements involved in continuous functioning of the factory, the stimuli
and rewards of the shoe manufacturer and the shoe machinery manufac-
turer."
27
His analysis of these contentions is that they distill to the proposition that the
research is dependent upon large revenues (monopoly return) and that the
leasing system is the means by which these returns are assured. This, under-
standably, is not an acceptable form for a conclusion on the propriety of the
machine rental system. Kaysen's own conclusions on particular aspects of the
leasing system, however, raise almost as many questions as they answer. Some
of Kaysen's conclusions on United's performance in this respect are listed be-
low, along with questions and comments designed to point up these unresolved
(at least for this reviewer) difficulties:
1. The leasing system provides significant support to United's market power
by:
(a) Running for 10 years: Shorter terms, it is assumed, would make
switching from United to alternative machines more likely. In the long run
this would make the entry of new shoe machinery firms easier. The long term
lease, Kaysen points out, means that the cost of "untying" the lease (i.e., get-
ting out from under its terms) may be substantial. But the relevance of this
untying cost to the prospects for new entry depends on Kaysen's inference
that the cost cannot be levied in an alternative form with a similar effect upon
entry. A shorter term lease, however, if it is potentially less restrictive on the
activity of the shoe manufacturer, is worth paying for, and United can be ex-
pected to take this into account in setting the short term rental fee. If this is
so, then in the longer run as much income (in real terms) is produced by lower
rentals for longer terms as by higher rentals for shorter terms. Kaysen's
"rational calculation" is different:
"[Dleferred payments and termination charges are not primarily for the
purpose of producing income and do not in fact produce income ....
[T]he incidence of these payments involves something more than the pay-
ment over time under a lease system of the equivalent to what is paid in
one lump under a sales system .... "28
(b) The existence of a full capacity clause: Kaysen indicates that forbid-
ding the use of a competing machine unless the United machine is fully utilized
acts as a deterrent to the use of competing machines. Analytically the problem
is similar to that of long term, leases. Here again the question can be raised as
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price of a shoe machine would not be higher. Kaysen's preference for sale over
lease seems to assume that the sales price would not or could not give substantial
effect to the cost of this restriction on the buyer. Lower prices, as desirable as
they may be, are not usually found to create more favorable conditions for
entry. Entry can be expected to be accomplished when the total cost of adopt-
ing a new machine is less than the incremental cost of continuing to use the
old. Long term leases or full capacity clauses increase the costs of adopting
the new, but converting these into sunk costs--i.e., including them in the sales
price when the machine is sold-has the same long term effect upon the buyer.
2. A full line supports market power by giving an ability to discriminate in
price.
Does this not come close to an equivalent of the "recoupment fallacy" ?2
Where competition exists there are low markups over cost, but of what relevance
is it that there are high markups elsewhere? Of course, the higher the price
the more likely is entry. Is this to imply that United, without discrimination,
would keep all prices high so entry is more likely, or that all prices would be
lower so entry is less likely? Should United, because it has substantial market
power, be denied the right to meet competition in good faith on particular
products ?
3. Price discrimination may enable United to drive out a single-line com-
petitor even if the two are equally efficient.30
How would this be done-by selling below marginal cost and exhausting
the competitor's bank-roll? And how will United prevent exhausting as much
or more of its own funds than those of its competitors; or is United's power in
this respect assumed to be based on imperfections in the credit market?
4. "Given a sales [as opposed to leasing] system and the existence of more
than one supplier for most machines, the tie-up of credit and machine which
now exists would be broken."31
Is not this a bit like saying incantations and a glass of cold water will quench
thirst?
5. "United's monopoly position may tend to promote caution rather than
boldness in e.rploiting new developments."3 2
This assumes: (1) there will be less monopoly without leasing; and (2)
monopoly rewards retard rather than promote new development. How can one
29. When a company has a monopoly in one line or in one area it will attempt to
maximize its revenue from this line or in this area. The revenue so provided may be used
to cut prices elsewhere, but similar use could also be made of a generous bequest from
one's grandmother. Price cutters can recoup from other areas only on the improbable
assumption that cut prices in the area of competition somehow teach them what they
should have known before concerning their area of monopoly.
30. P. 78.
31. P. 205. (Emphasis added.)
32. P. 196.
1956]
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be sure that the leasing system (including tie-ins, price discrimination, long-
terms, etc.) is any more than a means of maximizing the return from power
possessed? Wouldn't as much monopoly power exist absent the lease?
6. United bears the risks of obsolescence.
Buyers of machines, by paying for risks directly rather than indirectly as a
part of rent, must, if they would buy newer and different machines than they
rent, find these more worth paying for directly than indirectly. Assuming
rationality by the supplier equal to the rationality of the buyers, is not a new
machine that is worth buying or selling a new machine worth borrowing or
lending? Of course, if more competition among sellers is assumed we revert
to the assumption in point 1 above-that the elimination of leasing will de-
crease the monopoly of the seller.
7. The leasing system is a benevolence to shoe manufacturers.
Why is a policy which lowers the capital requirements in shoe manufacture
by making it unnecessary for entrants in that industry to make large outlays
for the purchase of shoe machinery any more benevolent than the Hertz auto-
mobile rental service? The implication of the "benevolence" of leasing is that
absent leasing United would exact more monopoly revenue and that it does
not know or will not maximize its own interests even in the long-run. What
that is useful can an economist derive from a "nonrationality" hypothesis?
The Supplies Markets
In Chapter VI Kaysen indicates that United has substantial market power
in many of the supply fields. This strength in part rests on close technical re-
lations between machines and some supplies, and in part on the economies of
providing a full line, especially as a complement to machinery. Also there is
the important question of the relevance of tie-ins (Chapter VII).
One of the government's contentions is that low machine rates were con-
sidered desirable to promote the sale of United supplies. 33 Joel Dean, economic
consultant for the defendant, argued that this kind of evidence was of no sig-
nificance. If United is dominant in the machine market, he contended, it can
make all the monopoly profit possible out of the combination of the machine
and the supply for that machine by charging high prices on its machines, even
if the prices on supply are at competitive levels. Thus, there is no incentive to
gain control over supplies.34 Kaysen never meets this argument about profit
maximization head on. Rather, he talks about the uneasiness of the assumptions
33. P. 251.
34. The additional point is also made that entry into supplies is easier than into
machines. Consequelitly a policy of low profits on machines and high -profits on supplies.
as alleged, will actually encourage rather than impede entry into supplies. This, of course.
assumes that there are no effective tie-ins, which is the point under consideration. See
p. 252.
[Vol. 66
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involved in another argument. 35 In admitting the logical correctness of Dean's
theoretical argument, Kaysen is not at his best.3 6 The Dean argument is sound
as a theory of profit maximization only if the "tied" and the "tying" products
are demanded in fixed proportions-for example, a fixed number of eyelets for
each machine rental dollar. If variable proportions are involved, the sale of the
tied product might be essential (absent a counting device on the machine) to
measure how intensively a particular machine was used.37 This would make
it possible, by low rental on the machine and high supply prices, to charge in-
tensive users more and extensive users less in order to maximize return on
the machihw. Even in cases where maximization does not call for the biggest
user paying the highest price, as in the previous example, a tie-in can be a
necessary means of maximization when price discrimination among classes of
users is impossible-either because of law or because of the ability of low price
buyers to resell to high price buyers. In such a case maximization is only
possible at a unique price for each of the complements, the tying and the tied.
If absent the tie-in the tied product would sell for a price less than that price
at which it would maximize profit in combination with the proper price of its
complement, here again profit maximization calls for a tie-in.38 Query, is it
clear that in the shoe machinery industry the "facts" fit neither of these cases?
It seems at least possible that the case for or against tie-in sales, if in fact
there are tie-ins, is different from what Kaysen has shown.
In concluding the section on supplies Kaysen says, "In itself, integration of
supply and machine businesses, and of different types of supply businesses, is
not 'monopolistic,' and should not be illegal."39 He goes on to say, however,
that United's practices-quantity discrimination, non-price competition, tie-in
attempts-all tell against a performance justification of United's market posi-
tion.40 Remedy, here, Kaysen says, should look primarily to relief designed
to lessen dominance in the machine market, since United's power over supplies
rests thereon.
Remedies
Kaysen discusses four major lines of remedial action: dissolution of United;
forbidding leasing and certain associated injunctive provisions; divorcement
of certain United subsidiaries and lines; and special injunctive provisions
directed to supply markets.
35. As in note 34 supra.
36. See p. 252.
37. See Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv.
281,291 (1956).
38. If the market price of the tied product is above its maximizing price, no tie-in
would be required. The product (to be tied) could be bought by the seller of the "monop-
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Corporate dissolution
The major and deciding obstacle against the dissolution of United is the
existence of but a single machinery manufacturing plant with a single trained
labor force. The difficulty of dissolution, according to Kaysen, would be less
if leasing were to continue. But as the preceding analysis indicates, Kaysen
has a strong belief (much stronger than this reviewer, at least) that United's
monopoly power rests heavily on leasing. This makes possible his belief in the
ultimate efficacy of achieving new entry by temporary control of performance
without the necessity of recommending the more drastic remedy. In any event,
dissolution of a single plant operation would call for a recommendation going
well beyond that called for by available precedent.
An end to leasing
Kaysen's recommendation here is simple and unequivocal. United should be
enjoined from any other method of marketing machines than by sale, and all
existing machines on lease should be sold. His reasons for this recommendation
derive from his analysis of the leasing method as a source of United's power
and as a major obstacle to new entry. He would allow service to be sold by
the job or by yearly contract, but it could not be tied to a sale or extended by
contract beyond one year. Repair parts would be sold in a nondiscriminatory
manner whether or not service is provided by United.
Kaysen's recommendation of compulsory sale rather than an optional lease
or sale equivalent, asked for by the government and decreed by Judge WVyzan-
ski, is based in part on a judgment as to its practicality: it would not require
close and continuous supervision by the court. Moreover, he predicts that if
United were deprived of the lease-service bundle, United would move straight
away to sale. If this prediction is accurate, it involves action by United against
the wishes of most of its customers-if their testimony can be believed. More-
over, assuming the accuracy of Kaysen's prediction about United moving
straight away to sale if deprived of the lease-service bundle, it is difficult to
understand why the option is objectionable. Kaysen's compulsory sale recom-
mendation was not followed. Whether this was because the government did
not request it, the customers did not want it, or the judge had reservations
about its efficacy is a matter for pure speculation.
Additional restraints recommended for remedial action include injunction
against acquisition of shoe-machinery business for ten years (an absolute pro-
hibition) ; injunction against acquisition of patents or patent application from
persons not in United's employ for ten years; prohibition against acquisition
of second-hand machinery (except repossession) for ten years; and finally.
compulsory licensing of patents at reasonable royalties for five years.
Divestiture of certain activities
Kaysen's proposed relief is designed to ease or eliminate the barriers to entry
in the shoe machinery business. He recognizes that this is likely to be a slow
and uncertain process, especially for firms starting from scratch. United's sub-
[Vol. 66
HeinOnline  -- 66 Yale L.J. 312 1956-1957
REVIEWS
sidiary B.B. Chemical Corporation, United's Cement Shoe Department, two
eyelet manufacturing branches, and United's Eyeletting Department, even
though they are engaged in complementary rather than competing operations
with the rest of United, provide a nucleus of personnel, experience and know-
how which, Kaysen believes, if operated independently, is likely to expand into
lines competitive with United. Consequently their divestiture is recommended,
even though it was not urged by the government. Here again, Kaysen's recom-
mendation was not followed in the decree.
Additional remedies in the supply field
Even if the preceding recommendations were followed, United would still
continue to dominate the markets for many categories of supplies; further
limitations on United's performance in the supply field are therefore recom-
mended. These include: prohibiting United from distributing supplies it does
not manufacture, a ban on acquisition in the supply field, and an injunction
against volume discounts as opposed to quantity discounts that can be cost
justified.
The Decree
The substantive provisions of the final decree can be grouped into seven
categories:
(1) United must offer for sale any machine it offers for lease on substantively
equal terms.
(2) Lease terms (principal provisions):
(a) May not exceed 5 years.
(b) Return charges can not differ depending upon whose machine dis-
places an existing machine.
(c) Service must be charged for separately, on an operation-by-oper-
ation basis or by contract not to exceed one year, and must be
available to buyers and to renters.
(d) Parts must be available to all customers on equal terms.
(e) Change in substance of lease terms, except for nondiscriminatory
price provisions, must obtain court approval.
(3) Settlement of outstanding leases must involve consultation by United
with the government, with representatives of the National Shoe Manu-
facturers Association and any lessees as intervenors. They must prepare
a nondiscriminatory termination plan that will be accomplished within
a reasonable time.
(4) United must dispose of its business (including subsidiary business) in
manufacture and distribution of tacks, nails and eyelets, and must not
distribute supplies of companies in which its stock interest is less than
20 percent.
(5) Acquisitions: United may not acquire any shoe machinery or factory
supply business if the transaction exceeds $10,000. It may not acquire
patents except from employees unless it agrees to license them on a rea-
1956]
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sonable royalty basis. United may not acquire second-hand machinery
(except to $25,000 per annum for experimental purposes).
(6) United must license its patents on a nonexclusive, nondiscriminatory,
reasonable royalty basis, also providing technical information at a reason-
able charge.
(7) Discounts on supplies must comply with provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
The court decree adopts, or is consistent with, Kaysen's analysis of the case,
giving primary emphasis to temporary control over United's performance as
a means of overcoming the results of a finding of market power and of easing
conditions of potential entry. The court, however, does not follow the Kaysen
specific recommendation with respect to compulsory leasing or the disposal of
the B.B. Chemical subsidiary. The court decree thus does not differ from the
results of similar court interpretations as Kaysen would have wished. Kaysen,
understandably, as an economist is able to exercise somewhat more leeway in
this respect than is consistent with the proper role of a district court judge.
It is much too early to evaluate the effects of the decree and the "potential
competition" thesis which it implies. In economic terms, prior cases apart,
there were alternative possibilities for resolving the case. First, dismember-
ment of United would have involved a judgment that the loss in economies of
operation from the existing structure with one manufacturing plant would
have been more than compensated for by the creation of "real" as against
"potential" entrants. Evidence available to K6.ysen off economies of scale was,
however, admittedly inconclusive (except to show that the defense could not
bear its burden of proof).
At the other extreme it would have been possible to find that the practices
and the performance, recited in detail in the record and analyzed as crucial
entry inhibiting factors by Kaysen, were economically largely irrelevant. It
could have been emphasized that the potential competition afforded by large
shoe manufacturers with knowledge of the use and operations of the machines,
kept United from exercising anything but temporary power. The post decree
experience of rising machine costs to shoe manufacturers is not inconsistent
with such a conclusion.
Kaysen followed a middle position. This is perhaps to be expected, for his
task was to provide helpful guidance to a judge whose analysis can not be
solely economic and whose decision can not depart widely from previous
decisions in which analogous problems have been raised. But the prescribed
solution to the problem of economic power in the shoe machinery industry has
independent merit that should not be minimized-the decree provisions estab-
lish an experiment by which the conclusions concerning easier entry may be
tested. Seldom before has such an opportunity for observation been available
to students of monopoly problems.
WVARD S. BOWMAN, JR.t
tAssociate Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School.
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